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BEING BETTER AMERICANS AND DOING IT FOR THEM: 
THE PEACE CORPS IN MICRONESIA 
by 
Craig J. Severance 
There is a tired but potentially historic adage about the successive 
colonial powers in Micronesia which states: The Spanish came for God, 
the Germans for gold, the Japanese for glory, and the Americans for 
good. Each power, of course, had multiple and conflicting motives, as 
did the individuals involved. To go to Micronesia "for good" ·in the 
American period includes being good and doing good, and is thus an 
expression of the basic American values Kiste refers to in this volume. 
To go to Micronesia "for good" also includes or has at least resulted in 
America being in Micronesia for good, meaning permanently. 
My argument perpetuates this ambiguity of American motives by 
suggesting that a number, but by no means all, of the Peace Corps 
Volunteers who came to Micronesia were able to be good in the 
humanitarian sense and were able to do good in the educational, 
political, SOCial, and economic development arenas. In the process, 
their activities supported the expanded programs and raised expectations, 
particularly in the outer islands, which have helped keep the U.S. in 
Micronesia for good. 
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Peace Corps burst on the Micronesian scene in October of 1966 with a 
promotional effort that set a contrast between the volunteers as the 
"better Americans" who were going to do good things for the Micronesians, 
and the civil service and Trust Territory personnel who were subtly 
characterized as being somewhat aloof and segregated in their subsidized 
government housing. There is suggestive evidence that the Peace Corps -
Washington staff finally agreed to institute programs for Micronesia 
(originally perceived as a domestic responsibility) under political 
pressure from the State Department and the White House because they 
perceived an opportunity to make a dramatic i~act in Micronesia. Such 
an impact would improve the organization's ability to justify its annual 
appropriation requests before Congress. 
A full history of the political decisions to send in the Peace Corps 
and an assessment of the actual impact of the Peace Corps in the 
different districts of the Trust Territory is a practically impossible 
task because of the uniqueness of the personnel and the communities 
involved, and the lack of detailed statistical data on the number of 
volunteers and projects operating at any time. This preliminary overview 
will hopefully encourage further research into this massive and "crash" 
program of social change. 
The paper first briefly sketches the history of the Peace Corps as 
an organization, and then looks at the political decision to send Peace 
Corps Volunteers to a "domestic area." This is followed by a I1I)re 
detailed sketch of the initial thrust of the Peace Corps in Micronesia 
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and of significant changes from early progranming to the present. A 
critical look at the Truk Program under its first two directors 
(1966-1970) will show a sample of the types of projects that volunteers 
attempted. The paper ends with a preliminary assessment of the overall 
Peace Corps impact. 
THE PEACE CORPS IDEA 
In its initial conception, the Peace Corps idea embodied an inherent 
conflict between perceived national needs and international humanitarian 
deeds. The Peace Corps was to be an apolitical organization that would 
promote international understanding and demonstrate the goodness and 
effectiveness of volunteers, thus countering the "Ugly American" image. 
Humanitarian deeds and success of the Peace Corps were expected to have a 
positive and thus, ultimately political, impact on the American image 
abroad. 
The Peace Corps idea captured the imagination of the New Frontier 
personnel that came to Washington with the Kennedy administration. The 
concept was sold to John F. Kennedy by Hubert Humphrey, Sargent Shriver 
and other close advisors, and it was sold to Congress at least partly on 
the grounds that it would be an inexpensive solution to a major 
international image problem. It also would provide a cadre of returned 
volunteers with foreign language skills, knowledge, and cultural 
sensitivity. 
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The initial intent of the Peace Corps idea to use pilot programs and 
cautious experimentation abroad was countered by the confidence "that 
almost any right-spirited American could accomplish sane good overseas'· 
(Lowther' and Lucas. 1978). The Wiggins memo. ''The Towering Task." which 
was originally written for the International Cooperation Administration. 
convinced Shriver that the Peace Corps could only establish itself in the 
Washington competitive hierarchy if it conmitted enough manpower to meet 
the real need abroad. In the words of a pair of friendly critics. "the 
numbers game" substituted for' careful progranming and developed a 
momentlJll . of its own as country directors cOOJ,leted for' funds and for the 
bett~r "volunteers" (LMher and Lucas:. 1978). Volunteers fpr whan jobs 
had not been adequately planned or programmed were Simply assumed to be 
self-starting enough to create their own placements. 
Shriver's personal enthusiasm and charisma appears to have been a 
substantial factor in initially convincing many host countries to accept 
NO 1 unteers. Peace Corps staff were, recruited for thei r youth and 
enthusiasm and soon projected an image opposite to' that of the staid 
career bureaucrat in washington and abroad. This image was epitanized by 
Shriver's "in-up-out" principle (1964-1970). whereby staff members could 
ho Id poSitions for no longer than five years. lest they put more energy 
into keeping their jobs than doing them. Such a staff image and style 
couldn't help but ruffle the . feathers of experienced administrators in 
competing Washington agencies and eventuany in the Trust Territory as 
well. 
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In 1966, Shriver was replaced by Jack Vaughn, a quieter but 
overseas-experienced administrator, who began slowly to institute more 
careful programming and evaluation. He also gave more autonomy to area 
directors to reduce internal competition for funds and volunteers. 
During this period, the concept of "conmunity action" and "conmunity 
development" had evolved from the idea of "aided self help" to an almost 
mystical act of faith that when challenged or stimulated, communities 
would take act.ion to help themselves. Volunteers without carefully 
programmed or necessary jobs could thus easily shift to "doing" community 
development. 
The national experience of the later 1960s included a reassessment 
of what it means to be involved in dOing "good" overseas, especially 
among the AS generalists (liberal arts graduates) who formed the bulk of 
the pool of potential volunteers. The Nixon administration replaced 
Vaughn with Blatchford, whose partisan style led to a massive resignation 
of exper1enced Washington and country Peace Corps staff. The period of 
the seventies under Blatchford and Balzano witnessed a shift from playing 
the "numbers game" to an emphasiS on host country defined needs, 
appropriate numbers of technically experienced older volunteers, and a 
careful weeding out of political idealists. 
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PEACE CORPs-MICRONESIA 
Peace Corps-Micronesia was a unique program, and in the 1960s. it 
may well have become the extreme case of the numbers game. The idea of 
sending Peace Corps Volunteers to Micronesia appears to have been 
considered as early as 1962, when the Trust Territory budget ceilings 
were increased to accommodate the accelerated educational programs. 
These were at least partly a result of .criticism by the 1961 United 
Nations Visiting Mission and Kennedy's personal anger about the polio 
epidemic in the Marshalls.· High Commissioner Goding's administration 
ushered in a major shift in educational and language programming from 
that of the Gibson years. A modest initial proposal of 60 volunteers in 
education and community development was opposed by at least one 
congressman on fiscal grounds in 1962 (Ballendorf and Seay. 1976). 
Postponement of this proposal may have been partly the result of Peace 
Corps Washington's' concern with its relations with Congress, because as 
an independent agency it had to annually justify appropriations requests. 
A modest proposal for volunteers was also incorporated in the 
Solomon Report. and additional legal problems about the definition of 
I1domestic area" caused by OEO legislation were sorted out by 1965. It 
appears from the public sources that a variety of continuing criticism of 
the Trust Territory administration, particularly over health conditions, 
and fear of an adve.rse report from the forthcoming 1967 U.N. Visiting 
Mission led to a resurrection of the planned Peace Corps-Micronesia 
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program. The administration approached the Congress of Micronesia and 
the district legislatures and received an immediate endorsement of the 
Peace Corps idea in spring of 1966 (Nufer, 1978). 
In May, the program was announced, and a massive and successful 
recruitment campaign was begun. The incoming country director brought 
some experienced volunteers from elsewhere, but most trainees responded 
to a brochure mailed to graduating college seniors' home addresses just 
before summer vacation. The brochure: "Peace Corps Goes to Paradise" 
admitted that there were serious problems in Micronesia, but also made it 
easy to apply with an abbreviated application form and no required test. 
The Pritchard Memo appears to have set the stage for Micronesia 
programming: liThe Peace Corps intends to alter substantially in a 
relatively short period of time, say three to five years, the twenty year 
record of neglect and dismal achievement." Pritchard seems to have 
recognized the potential program impact of large numbers of volunteers on 
small islands and to have'justified the proposed program size by saying 
that program guidelines developed from the Micronesian experience would 
be useful elsewhere (Ballendorf and Seay, 1976). 
This preliminary sketch of a history of decision-making in a 
geographically dispersed bureaucracy assumes that more general phases and 
program goals are reinterpreted as they trickle down to the levels of 
action. It is clear that some staff members and some volunteers 
perceived themselves as a different kind of American who would do more 
"good" for the Micronesians, and that they conSCiously and publicly 
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projected the image to the Micronesi.ans. The initi.al promotilima 1 efforts 
within Micronesia sought to get .cOl1ltlUnity acceptance of volunteers and 
community support for the housing and feeding of volunteers. The 
promotional effort gained initial community support (or at least it was 
interpreted that way) and succeeded in ra;.sing the level of expectations 
about what the volunteers could do to an impossibly I'ligh level. It also 
placed heavy psychological pressure on indiVidual volunteers to 
accomplish sanething with visible impact before the end of thet1f- tour. 
Volunteers were not only competing with T.T. personnel for the respect of 
the Micronesians. they were competi.ng with each other for extremely 
scarce resources, incl uding teachi ng manuals. building materi a1s, etc., 
to support their activities. 
I have the impression, primarily fran the Trukexperience, that 
Micronesian communities were also occasionally caught up in this 
competition, so that volunteers with language skills or vi'si'bly 
successful projects were sources of community pride, and volunteers who 
had difficulty adjusting or sil11lly wanted to go slow enough to develop 
appropriate projects with full community participation were sources of 
community shame and disappointment. 
The sheer number of volunteers in the early per;.od~ 1967-1969, was 
bound to have substantial ;l11lact. More than 3, COG responded to the 
initial recruitng effort to send the Peace Corps to Paradise. There was 
a high rate of no-shows at the Flortda training sites and. possibly 
because of Vaughn's emphasis on quality, a high rate of. de-selection of 
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trainees by training staff. In spite of the attrition of recruits (only 
a very few were drafted out of training for military service), nearly 400 
volunteers arrived in Micronesia in October 1966. One hundred of these 
were partially trained, but not skilled in public health. Some of the 
health volunteers were rapidly transferred to an elementary level of 
teaching English as a second language (TESL), partly because few 
health-related jobs existed and some volunteers recognized that they 
lacked the skills to be effective in health. The second contingent 
arrived in January/February 1967, and by the Summer of 1967, there were 
more than 600 active volunteers in the Trust Territory. 
The "numbers game" peaked in 1968 with approximately 940 volunteers, 
a ratio of nearly one volunteer to every 100 Micronesians. A widely 
cited claim is that it would have taken five million volunteers to 
achieve the same ratio in a country like India, which after assessing 
volunteer impacts, imposed a ceiling of fifty volunteers for the whole 
country in 1974 (Gale, 1979). 
The great bulk of volunteers in this early period were in education 
related placements, having been trained in TESL/CD (Teaching English as a 
Second Language/Community Development), since they were· usually AS 
generalists by prior academic training. Of this group, nearly 30 percent 
terminated early, and another 10 percent transferred to other countries. 
A number of volunteers, however, liked Micronesia well enough to stay on 
for second tours, or to become Trust Territory personnel. By 1973, 
one-sixth of the expatriate T.T. personnel were former volunteers. 
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A IIlJch smaller percentage of the early volunteers had specialized 
skills in engineering. architecture, agriculture. fisheries and law. The 
Peace Corps lawyers probably had the most far-reaching impact. They 
became immediately involved in suggesting and drafting legislation for 
t.he Congress of Micronesia and the various district legislatures, and in 
preparing court briefs. In Yap, for example, the primary impact of the 
Peace Corps lawyers was getting the political system to function or work 
properly on the U.S. model by training Yap district legislators. In the 
process, the Yap Council was substantially weakened (Lingenfelter, 1974). 
The education (iESL) volunteers arrived at a time when the Public 
Works departments had been stretched to their limits building classrooms 
and i ndi vi dua 1 houses for regu 1 ar U. S. contract teachers under the 
Accelerated Elementary School Program (AESP) that had begun in 
1962-1963. The volunteer teachers filled a critical manpower need, 
because the T.T. administration had continuing difficulty in recruiting 
and retaining contract teachers. There were attempts to place volunteers 
in every school, and a significant departure from T.T. practice was the 
placement of volunteers in practically every outer island community. 
Peace Corps staff fears about volunteer isolation and safety on 
outer islands were lessened through the purchase of Peace Corps radios to 
be run by generators provided through PL 89-10 funds for audiovisual 
equipment for schools. The value of the Peace Corps radio net to 
Micronesians soon became apparent and the rate of expensive Medivacs 
(including a few false alarms) dramatically increased. Magistrates soon 
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began to rely on "their" volunteer to transmit messages, order supplies, 
and write grant-in-aid proposals. 
For many of the outer island communities, "their" volunteer was also 
their first resident American. The volunteers who adapted well to outer 
island living tended to have same language proficiency and to live local 
style, eating local food and treating Micronesians with open, friendly 
respect. I believe that a great deal of the successful personal 
adjustment, when it occurred, (there is no objective way to measure this) 
must be attributed to the resiliency and the cultural pattern of 
hospitality of the Micronesians towards visiting strangers. This is 
especially the case with those communities where volunteers continued to 
be accepted, housed and fed after their predecessors had been severe 
disappointments. 
The saturation of volunteers and relatively free shifting of 
placements made careful programming impossible. Peace Corps staff also 
simply lacked the detailed knowledge of dispersed island sites.' The 
unrealistic promotion of an image of the volunteers as "better Americans" 
and the volunteers' increasing demands on Trust Territory services for 
"their people" led to tensions between volunteers, staff, and the T.T. 
personnel. Volunteers had the freedom to be critical and to assert their 
political idealism, and on occasion, political activism. This activism 
triggered a sense of unease at headquarters and in Washington, and the 
perception grew that some volunteers were acting in ways that might be 
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detrimental to the trend, created by the Kennedy administration, toward 
permanent incorporation of Micronesia. 
Increasing criticism of the T.T. administration by Micronesians, 
petitions to the U.N., etc., were sanetimes attributed to the 
encouragement of activist volunteers. There are examples of volunteers 
who helped draft petitions to various. bodies, including the United 
Nations, or who provided information on legal rights, etc. . These 
volunteers were a convenient target for those in Saipan and Washington 
who feared increasing Micronesian political expression, although I 
believe that it is unrealistic and quite unfair to the Micronesians to 
assume that they would have remained quiescent without stimulus by 
volunteers. Articulate and overt Micronesian political expression was 
increasing before the volunteers arrived. 
This fear about the independent agents of the Peace Corps reached 
its high point with the 1969 visit by Marine Lieutenant-General Walt, who 
used the White House to try to pressure the Peace Corps into terminating 
the lawyers program. He was reacting to a resolution by the Palau 
District Legislature expressing opposition to a military training base, a 
position that he seems to have assUIIIeCI was the pet idea of a particular 
volunteer. The lawyers stayed, but they were warned to remain strictly 
non-political (Stern, 1969; Fite, 1970). 
By. the early 1970s, the changing programming thrust in Washington, 
increasing Micrones.ian canplaints and disillusiorunent about ineffective 
volunteers, and a growing sense of boredom among the TESL volunteers 
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themselves, led to a greatly reduced Peace Corps presence. 
Responsibility for teaching English as a Second language was passed to 
partly-trained Micronesians, and a programming emphasis on teacher 
training and curriculum development in the post-elementary schools 
prevailed. limited numbers of volunteers in health, agriculture and 
fisheries also served (Mason, 1975). The number of volunteers ranged 
between 200-300 through the late 1970s, and dropped to approximately 80 
in 1980-81. The programming thrust since 1980 appears to have 
re-emphasized rural development by placing small numbers of skilled 
volunteers in outer communities and the private sector (U.S. Department 
of State, 1981). 
PEACE CORPS - TRUK 1966-1969 
The more detailed and critical overview of Peace Corps programming 
presented below is based largely on personal experience and is admittedly 
impressionistic. It is meant to give a sample of programming thrust and 
ideology at the height of the "numbers game." Peace Corps - Truk under 
the first director may be the extreme case of shock tactics in community 
development and "doing it for them" in Micronesia. Recent informal 
conversations with returned volunteers from Palau and Yap suggest that 
there was also a similar emphasis on getting things done for the people, 
but I have no way of judging if the Truk case was at all typical. 
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The Truk director. having observed Trukese hospitality first hand. 
·reliedon it as a way of providing housing and feeding support. for 
volunteers. thus freeing a portion of the volunteers' $80 a month living 
allowance to be matched by unpub1icized Peace Corps- Truk program funds 
and invested in material for projects. Renting of volunteer housing was 
possible and a figure of $20 a month was suggested. but there was an 
iJl1)lici.t understanding that comnunities that were willing to hOuse and 
feed a volunteer rent-free should benefit in terms of a monetary 
i·nvestment in projects with visible material impact. This director 
publicly projected an image of volunteers as "the better Americans". who 
would accomplish great things and would be unlike the aloof and overpaid 
T~ T. personne 1. TESL vo 1 unteers were therefore not 'a 11 owed to 1 ive in 
the empty contract teacher houses adjacent to their schools in some 
lagoon communities. Volunteers visiting Moen were not allowed to sleep 
or even shower in contract housing, even if invited by sympathetiC T.. T. 
personnel. The "good" volunteers were those who spent their time with 
their people, rather than with other Americans. There were so many 
volunteers that this was sometimes difficult. For eXaJI1)le, in 1967 Moen 
had 29 assigned volunteers. Eta1, an ~11 in the Mortlocks, had three 
volunteers for 300 people. In order to avoid conflict. these three 
quickly agreed not to start any projects without checking first with each 
other. 
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The initial community development emphasis was on water projects of 
various scale, including pumps, catchments, tanks, showers, and waterseal 
toilets. The first lnajor project was on Toloas (Dublon) in Truk Lagoon, 
where an old Japanese water catchment was to be resurrected by digging it 
out, covering it and extending piping to the village below. The 
volunteer folklore surrounding the Dublon water project is extensive, 
but the version I'm familiar with. is as follows. 
The first group of volunteers for Truk and Ponape were simply taken 
off the plane a~d put on the M boat to Toloas so they could start on the 
water project. Although a staff member had been scouting the project, 
there was little advance notice of the volunteers' arrival and no formal 
housing and feeding arrangements had been made. The people of Toloas 
responded graciously by housing and feeding on the second and third days 
after their arrival, but did not simply pick up shovels to join the 
volunteers in digging. There simply weren't enough shovels in Public 
Works or the Truk Trading Company I Meanwhile, the Ponape PC director was 
so incensed at this use of his volunteers, that he had them pulled off 
Toloas and placed on emergency ship transportation to Ponape. 
The volunteer who inherited this project did obtain a $30,000 Trust 
Territory Grant-in-Aid for pipe and cement on the grounds that the people 
of Toloas would match the contribution with labor. Problems over land 
use, rights-of-way for the pipes, placement of the spigots and labor 
commitment soon became apparent. The volunteer finally made an agonizing 
decision to cancel the project and return the money to Saipan. By this 
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time, some Truk volunteers had begun to argue for !nore of a felt needs 
approach where community support was evident, although the need to 
accomplish something visible was still felt by most volunteers. 
The second Truk contingent of new volunteers was sent from the plane 
to Fefan Island to install a variety of wells and PumpS9 and again the 
Trukese generously responded with free housing and food, and stood by as 
the volunteers tried to find labor and material for their projects. 
Problems with land and water rights arose again. One volunteer finally 
became exasperated enough \tJhen his vi11agers didn't show up to install 
the Puq) where he wanted it, that he dug the well himself. He 
inadvertently. installed "his" pump just over the boundary of the next 
village. 
The third major project disaster in the eyes of the more criti·cal 
Truk volunteers was the Udot Peace Corps tra1:ning program 1n August 
1967. The Peace Corps provided materi-als to families who ·would build the 
houses, feed and work with the trainees and then inherit. the houses in 
exchange at the end of the training program. A series .of 
miscoomunicationsand an unrealistic deadline forc.cJq)letion of .the 
houses led the Udotpeople to elqlel a volunteer i:nvolvedwith the 
project. Unprepared recrutts were greeted with hostility rather than 
hospitality and another crash program "to do it for them" simply 
crashed. Sc.or.e: 46 houses. 2 outboard boats, IJIQre chi ldren speaking 
English phrases, and a f'es:i<iue of call1lUl1~ty hostility and disillusionment 
(Molinsky, 1968). 
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Lest I paint too dismal a picture, there were many projects which 
received the backing of the community and a tremendous amount of 
volunteer labor and donated materials. These kinds of projects have been 
described by Ballendorf and Seay (who was the second director of Peace 
Corps Truk) as social brick and mortar projects. They were more in line 
with the original conception of aided self-help and they often made 
ingenious use of local materials. The famous Onei school was built with 
T.T. grant-in-aid funded labor, but locally contributed material in the 
form of coral blocks that were hand hewn. Architecturally, the open air 
buildings were a dramatic contrast to the dilapidated concrete block AESP 
schools (Kluge, 1968). 
The Peace Corps School Partnership Program provided limited funds 
(up to $2,000) for matched labor and materials whenever aggressive 
volunteers could obtain cooperation or interest from their magistrates 
and communities. Smaller grants-in-aid from T.T. and district 
legislature sources were also obtained for dispensaries, water tanks, 
etc. Here, the more successful volunteers cooperated relatively closely 
with their island or village councils and performed the role of writing 
the grant proposals with, rather than for, "their" magistrate. Some 
magistrates learned enough from this process so that subsequent small 
scale grants-in-aid for municipal public works continued to be 
successfully obtained without the aid of a resident volunteer. This 
visible contribution was relatively small in comparison with the much 
larger scale construction activities in the administrative center, 
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especially the Truk hospital and courthouse. These small scale 
grants-in-aid for schools, dispensaries, catchments, etc., occurred 
primarily in. the outer islands. They may have succeeded in giving some 
of the poorer· and politically less powerful outer island cOlllllllnities a 
sense of participation in the overall construction growth of the period. 
These. smaller scale municipally sponsored projects were subsequently 
overshadowed by T.T. sponsored school and dispensary.co.nstruction in the 
.seventies that included payment for island labor. 
Other kinds of projects more i~ keeping with the notion of training 
the people to help themselves were also at~ted. The Fefan fanners' 
co-op struggled along while trying to establish a mar-keton Moen as a 
volunteer kept. the· books. The co-op continues to provide some fresh 
,produce for Moen even today. Two of at least three salt fish producing 
cooperatives on the outer. islands failed as soon as the sponsoring 
volunteer left. 
Volunteers in teaching English as a second language had a less 
visible and perhaps unmeasurable impact. They gave repetitive drills 
using the oral-aural method and used a variety of materials that had both 
patterned practices and dialogues. There was no apparent consistency in 
the language materials available to the TESL volunteers at this time. 
Some outer island volunteers adapted the Tate South Pacific Commission 
materials, and combined them with Crouch's adult education dialogues that 
had been adapted to the sound contrasts of Lagoon Trukese. Much of the 
English language learning probably took place outside of the classroom. 
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Paradoxically, volunteers who lacked Trukese language skills may have had 
a somewhat greater teaching impact because they constantly spoke in 
English. 
I lack detailed information on volunteer activities after 1968, 
although my impression from participating in a training program in Truk 
in 1972 is that the overall quality of the recruits, with some 
exceptions, had significantly declined. By this time, the super 
saturation of Moen with resident and visiting volunteers and the 
accompanying inflated expectations had generated disillusionment, 
hostility and some verbal harassment on the part of the Trukese youth. A 
much lower volunteer profile was in evidence. 
OVERALL IMPACTS 
In sketching the eariy Truk experience, I do not mean to imply that 
the Peace Corps in other districts was either as defective or effective •. 
Individual volunteers in Micronesia sometimes established close personal 
friendships with Micronesian individuals and host families. Many of 
these friendships have continued and have occasionally included 
educational sponsorship of Micronesian youth. This represents the 
person-to-person communication and understanding that was a major part of 
the original Peace Corps idea. I believe that most of the 
infrastructural developments that have been concentrated in the urban 
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centers would have occurred without the presence of the Peace Corps. On 
the other hand, I suspect that the remoter outer island communities. would 
have received less of the overall development funds if they had lacked 
resident volunteers. There appears to be a greater reservoir of good 
feelings towards Americans in outer communities. 
There is a very mixed assessment of Peace Corps impacts by 
Micronesians and returned volunteers, depending on whom you talk to and 
what their expectations of the Peace Corps may have been (see Nufer, 
1978). Lawyers may have helped the legislatures and courts to begin 
func~ioning more smoothly. TESL teachers may have given more exposure to 
standard English, both inside and outside the schools. Individual 
volunteers may have shared their political convictions - about freedom 
and independence and the American military - in the local language with 
close Micronesian friends. They may also have encouraged Micronesians to 
demand and expect more from the Americans. 
The most significant overall impact may well be, as Ballendorf and 
Seay suggest, in the area of education, since Micronesia now seems to 
have a higher percentage of educated inhabitants than almost any other 
colonial area 1n the world. For Americans, education is such a 
self-evident good that it is rarelyquestioned. In retrospect, I have 
come to agree with Fran Hezel's conclusion that "the major adverse 
effects of education are economic rather than socio-cultural--that ·;s, 
the expensive system, with a goal of almost universal education, costs so 
much and leads to such further costs that it makes the hope of any 
partial self-reliance all the more distant." (Hezel, 1984) 
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Perhaps because there were so many volunteers who came to Micronesia 
to do good, enough stayed to help foster the rapidly expanding programs 
and the Micronesian belief that education equals success in the fonm of a 
government job. Since such jobs come from American fundings, it appears 
that the ultimate, if individually unintentional, impact on Micronesian 
expectations and demands has supported the ambiguous American goal of a 
U.S. presence in Micronesia for goodl 
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